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Abstract 
The Occupational Health and Safety record is relatively poor in shipping and under-
reporting of incidents is a concern in the industry. Much previous research investigated 
why workers did not report, this paper shifts the focus to examine whether management 
genuinely welcomes safety related reports in the context of Chinese chemical shipping. It 
reveals a functional decoupling between policy and practice related to incident reporting 
despite external monitoring. While companies had policies and procedures to encourage 
reporting, in practice the management associated seafarer competence with the number of 
problems reported and discouraged the crew from reporting problems which would be 
difficult or costly to solve. The findings suggest that to address the issue of under-reporting, 
it is more appropriate to deal with the problem of decoupling than to focus on changing 
crew’s behaviour.  
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Introduction 
Shipping is a relatively risky industry and its safety record has been a concern of the 
stakeholders (Bloor et al., 2000; Robert and Marlow, 2005). For example, a Danish paper 
suggested that Danish fleet seafarers were about six times more likely to die from 
occupational accidents compared with Danish workers ashore (Borch et al., 2012; Hansen, 
1996). Against this background, and spurred by a few high profile sea accidents, 
particularly the tragic loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which 
came into force worldwide in phases between 1998 and 2002. One of the key components 
of the Code is the requirement of incident reporting from ship to shore. Despite this 
requirement, it has been found that under-reporting remains a serious problem which 
undermines the proper functioning of a safety management system in this industry (Ellis et 
al., 2010; Hassel et al., 2011; Luo and Shin, 2016; Psarros et al., 2010).  
 
Following the ISM implementation, a number of studies were undertaken to identify 
barriers to reporting. Oltedal and McArthur (2011) did a questionnaire survey on the 
Norwegian merchant fleet, Kongsvik et al. (2012) conducted another one on offshore 
service vessels operating on the Norwegian continental shelf, and Lappalainen et al. (2011) 
conducted an interview study in Finnish shipping companies. These studies revealed a 
number of significant factors that encouraged or inhibited incident reporting, including 
safety training and seafarers’ competence, safety management, general safety practice, 
feedback on reporting, and perceived demand for cost-effectiveness and efficiency. 
Bhattacharya (2011) took an ethnographic approach; he went on ships and studied 
reporting in practice. His research findings suggested that seafarers were reluctant to report 
for fear that they would get blamed, or even lose their jobs, for reported incidents. This fear 
indicated a blame culture which remains operative in the industry (MAIB, 2001).  
 
This culture of blame can hardly suggest that management genuinely encourages incident 
reporting. As such, instead of asking why employees do not report, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to ask to what extent employers welcome reporting. This question is important 
since if employers do not heartfeltedly welcome such a practice, any effort aiming to make 
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seafarers report would be in vain. This paper addresses this issue by examining incident 
reporting in the Chinese chemical shipping industry.   
 
Decoupling and interaction 
Very often organisations struggle to comply with externally imposed legal and regulatory 
requirements and to cope with the pressure of dominant public opinions and views of 
important institutions, because these requirements and pressure appear to be in conflict 
with organisational efficiency and compromise profit-maximising activities. Yet, for 
legitimacy and survival, compliance has to be demonstrated. In this context, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) noted that organisations may handle this conflict by decoupling between 
policies and practices. On the one hand, they adopt institutionalized policies, rules and 
procedures in line with public opinions, the force of laws, and views of important 
institutions; on the other, rules are often violated in practice and evaluation and inspection 
systems are subverted or avoided.  
 
Decoupling provides an important concept for empirically examining organizational policy 
and regulation implementation (Egels-Zandén, 2014; Fiss and Zajak, 2006; MacLean and 
Behnam, 2010; Wilhelm et al., 2016). Increased public sensitivity and more and more 
stringent legislation related to issues of environment, business ethics and Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) have forced organizations to adopt various Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) programmes and policies. Yet, numerous empirical research findings 
suggest that in many cases such adoptions mainly serve as ‘a form of window dressing, 
symbolic gestures designed to give the appearance of satisfying regulatory requirements 
and enhance external audiences’ perceptions of organizational legitimacy while still 
allowing for “business as usual”’ (Aravind and Christmann, 2011; Christmann and Taylor, 
2006; MacLean and Behnam, 2010; Weaver et al., 1999; Yeung and Mok, 2005). In a study 
of the ISO 14001 implementation, for example, Aravind and Christmann (2011) found no 
significant difference in environmental performance between certified and non-certified 
facilities for the overall sample, though a sub-group of high-quality implementers had 
better environmental performance than their non-certified counterparts.  
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Furthermore, past research has offered a nuanced understanding of coupling and 
decoupling between policy and practice. Weaver et al. (1999) examined the 
implementations of corporate ethics programmes in the 1994 Fortune 500 listed service 
and industrial companies and differentiated between ‘decoupled’ and ‘integrated’ 
implementation. They found that while executive commitment to ethics was positively 
associated with integrated implementation, top management commitments to financial and 
strategic concerns was significantly related to decoupled implementation. Christmann and 
Taylor (2006) studied the implementation of the ISO 9000 quality management system in 
Chinese supply firms and differentiated between ‘symbolic’ and ‘substantive’ 
implementation. They noted that customer monitoring and sanctions were key drivers of 
implementation quality. This finding is widely supported by other studies (Egels-Zandén, 
2014; Jamali et al., 2017). According to Gunningham et al. (2004; 2005), when external 
pressure is strong, organizations may go ‘beyond compliance’ in order to preserve 
corporate reputation and avoid economic sanctions such as consumer boycotts, troubles in 
future project expansion and development, and expensive lawsuits. Egels-Zandén (2014) 
observed a few factors that would help integrate CSR policy and practice: 1) increased 
external demands; 2) more effective external monitoring and sanctions; and 3) internalised 
external demands. Egels-Zandén (2014) further noted that external demand and monitoring 
may raise workers’ awareness of their rights and empower them to demand for better 
employment conditions, which can also put pressure on management.    
 
Though previous research focussed on drawing out individual factors, the evidence 
nevertheless showed that these factors, as well as the actors behind, interact with each 
other. When the external demands from customers or clients are strong with stringent 
surveillance and sanctions, they may empower workers to protect their rights, and under 
both external and internal pressures, the management team of the firm would be more likely 
to internalise such demands and show commitment to integrated implementation. As such, 
the interaction between the involved parties is an important factor affecting policy and 
practice integration.  
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In shipping Port State Control (PSC) is one common mechanism of external monitoring. 
This is the inspection of foreign ships by PSC inspectors in national ports to verify that the 
ship is managed and operated in compliance with international regulations including the 
ISM Code. As chemical shipping involves more potential hazards than other shipping 
sectors, a number of extra (external) inspection regimes have been put in place, including 
the Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE) initiated by oil majors (such as Shell and 
British Petroleum) and the Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI) – Marine inspection 
programme, to safeguard maritime safety and environment. These inspection regimes are 
more stringent than PSC inspection, and chemical tankers have to pass their periodic 
inspections in order to conduct business with oil majors and major clients in chemical 
shipping. 
 
Regarding management commitment, it is explicitly stated in the ISM Code that successful 
implementation requires commitment from the top to invest adequate resources and to 
empower employees to participate in OHS management activities, such as risk assessment 
and incident reports, without fear of being blamed. However, as mentioned earlier, a culture 
of fear which prevents seafarers from reporting incidents is prevalent in shipping 
(Bhattacharya, 2011). Oltedal and McArthur (2011) and Kongsvik et al. (2012) found that 
the focus of management on efficiency when under commercial pressure also discouraged 
seafarers from making reports. More importantly, studies on ISM implementation and OHS 
management in shipping revealed that the management tended to prioritise financial gains 
at the cost of OHS (Sampson et al., 2013; Xue et al., 2017). These findings point to a lack 
of commitment from top management to OHS and ISM implementation.  
 
The interesting question arising here is why external surveillance has not resulted in 
commitment from management to OHS in shipping. The answer we believe lies in the 
interaction between the management, seafarers, and external inspectors who carry out ship 
vettings. Therefore we examine this interaction in the context of chemical shipping and 
explore how this interaction shapes the practice of incident reporting. By examining this 
hitherto unspecified factor, this paper will add a new dimension to the understanding of 
policy and practice in general and incident reporting in particular. As mentioned above, 
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chemical shipping is subject to more stringent external monitoring. It serves as a ‘critical 
case’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) – if stringent external monitoring does not generate genuine 
commitment to OHS in chemical shipping, less stringent monitoring in other shipping 
sectors is more likely to fail. As such, the findings of this paper are relevant to other 
shipping sectors.     
  
Studying Chinese chemical shipping 
This study focused on Chinese shipping industry. Since the 1980s, the Chinese shipping 
industry has been growing rapidly. According to recent statistics (UNCTAD, 201), China 
is the third largest shipping nation in the world owning 8.9 per cent of the world fleet by 
tonnage. China also has the largest seafarer population in the world, more than half a 
million by the end of 2015 (CMSA, 2015).  
 
The research was conducted in two Chinese chemical shipping companies located in the 
Yangtze delta area in China. Company 1 (C1) is a subsidiary of its Group Company which 
specialises in oil and chemical transportation. By the end of 2015, the company owned 21 
special cargo carriers half of which were chemical tankers. Company 2 (C2) was 
established by a few strategic investors and by the end of 2015, it operated 15 chemical 
tankers. The fleets of both companies mainly traded in the Asia Pacific region, with a few 
large ships trading globally. Both companies had stable cooperation with major 
international petrochemical companies, and their ships passed external inspections from oil 
majors and chemical producers such as Shell, BP, Exxon-Mobil, and Dow Chemical.  
 
Both companies were managed by Chinese managers and their ships were manned by 
Chinese seafarers. Each company employed several hundred seafarers. While the majority 
of the crew members in C1 had long-term (5 – 10 years) contracts, only about 15 percent 
of the seafarer employees in C2 were employed on long-term contracts (usually 3 or 5 
years) with the rest recruited through crew agencies.  
 
Shipping management and operations are characterised by a hierarchical management, as 
well as physical separation between shore-based management and shipboard operations 
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(Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013). On top of the hierarchy are the directors and senior 
managers who are responsible for policy making and organisational budget allocation. The 
lower layer of onshore managers is made up of ship superintendents who look into the 
routine operation of the ships. Onboard a ship, each seafarer is known by his or her rank 
which determines their job descriptions and positions in the shipboard hierarchy (see 
Figure 1). The top four senior officers are captain, chief engineer, chief officer and second 
engineer who supervise and manage shipboard operations. Junior deck officers and 
engineers can be promoted to senior officers/engineers by gaining experience and acquiring 
higher qualifications. Likewise, a deck rating after several years of work experience can be 
promoted to a bosun, and an engine rating to a fitter.  
 
Figure 1. Shipboard hierarchy 
This study took a qualitative approach. In order to acquire a rounded understanding of the 
ISM implementation in the two shipping companies, detailed accounts from both shore-
based managers and shipboard seafarers were collected. The field researcher first visited 
the two companies’ headquarters where he collected relevant documents for this study and 
interviewed 14 managers. The management interviewees are listed on Table 1. 
COMPANY 1 COMPANY 2 
Rank Sea Qualification Rank Sea Qualification 
Vice General 
Manager (Safety) 
Captain Vice General 
Manager (Safety) 
Captain 
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Marine Affairs 
Manager 
Captain Safety and Quality 
Manager 
Captain 
Marine Affairs 
Superintendent 
Captain Marine Affairs 
Manager 
Captain 
Marine Engineering 
Manager 
Chief Engineer Marine Affairs 
Superintendent 
Captain 
Marine Engineering 
Superintendent 
Chief Engineer Marine Engineering 
Manager 
Chief Engineer 
Quality and Safety 
Superintendent 
Captain Marine Engineering 
Superintendent 
Chief Engineer 
Crewing Vice 
Manager 
2nd Officer Crewing Vice 
Manager 
Captain 
Table 1. Shore-based management interviewees 
The field researcher also obtained permission to sail with four chemical tankers (two from 
each company) for four research voyages. The details of the ships and voyages are shown 
on Table 2. During the four voyages, the field researcher worked with crew members, 
observed their daily work activities, and talked with them as a routine activity. In particular, 
he conducted formal and semi-structured interviews with 55 seafarers. Basically they 
covered the hierarchical structures of a ship as shown in Figure 1. These activities provided 
an in depth understanding of incident reporting practices from the perspectives of shore-
based management and the crew onboard ships. Although all interviews were conducted in 
Chinese, they were translated and transcribed into English for the convenience of data 
analysis. The Nvivo software was used to assist data coding and analysis. 
 COMPANY 1 COMPANY 2 
SHIP 1 SHIP 2 SHIP 3 SHIP 4 
L.O.A. 90M 135M 95M 100M 
D.W.T. 3,700T 12,400T 3,900 T 3,600 T 
Tank Coating 316L Steel Epoxy Resin Zinc Silicate Zinc Silicate 
 
Sailing Areas 
China, N.E. 
and S.E. Asia 
China, S.E 
Asia and 
Middle East 
China, N.E. 
and S.E. Asia 
China, N.E. 
and S.E. 
Asia 
Ship’s Nationality Chinese Chinese Chinese F.O.C 
Number of Crew 15 20 16 18 
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Port of Departure/ 
Cargo Carried 
Changzhou, 
China/Phenol 
Qingdao, 
China/ 
P-Xlene 
Jiangyin, 
China/Ethene 
Diol 
Changsu, 
China/None 
Port of Call/ Cargo 
Carried 
Daesan, 
South Korea/ 
Phenylethylene 
Dalian, 
China / 
P-Xlene 
 
None 
Mailiao, 
China/ 
Dichloroethane 
Port of Destination Shanghai, 
China 
Qingdao, 
China 
Quanzhou, 
China 
Jiangyin, 
China 
Total Days onboard 13 8 7 17 
Table 2. Details of ships and research voyages 
 
Regarding incident reports, a number of questions were asked in the interviews with both 
shore-based managers and seafarers, including their attitude and experience of incident 
reporting, factors affecting seafarers’ safety reporting to the shore-based management, and 
consequences/feedback of incident reporting. The analysis of the interview data and the 
field notes revealed that decoupling between policy and practice was common in the two 
companies.  
 
Incident reporting encouraged? 
The ISM Code states that a company should establish procedures to ensure that ‘non-
conformities, accidents and hazardous situations’ are reported to the shore-based 
management by seafarers onboard ships (section 9.1). Non-conformity is defined as ‘an 
observed situation where objective evidence indicates the non-fulfilment of a specified 
requirement’. An accident is an occurrence involving personal injury or casualty, damage 
to property, environment, a ship or its cargo. A hazardous situation is similar to a near-miss 
which refers to a sequence of events and/or conditions that could have resulted in loss. 
According to the Code, these incidents and near-misses should be ‘investigated and 
analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention’ (section 9.1). In 
addition, a company should also consult crew members for the purpose of ‘reviewing the 
safety management system and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based management’ 
(section 5.1.5).  
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In the two companies studied, procedures and forms for reporting ‘non-conformities’, 
‘accidents’ and ‘hazardous situations’ were in place, and all ships were required to make 
such reports to the shore-based management on a regular basis. Each of the crew members 
onboard a ship had the responsibility to report safety-related events to the shore 
management no matter how minor they were. Safety related reporting was seen as a 
‘window’ through which the management could monitor ship operations and conditions as 
well as a mechanism to facilitate ship management and improve safety. The managers in 
both companies claimed to have policies encouraging communication of safety issues. 
They also expressed understanding that incident reporting was a good practice because 
lessons could be learned to prevent similar incidents from reoccurring in the future and to 
‘avoid unnecessary economic losses’.  
 
As for the consequences of reporting, the management frequently made reference to ‘non-
blame culture’ to emphasise their attitude. For instance, a marine affairs superintendent 
said: 
The company adopts and always practices a non-blame policy. Seafarers are 
encouraged to report whatever incidents occurred. It is much better that you report 
ten near-misses than if you hide them but in the end they lead to an accident.  
 
In the Safety Management System (SMS) of C1, it was stated: 
The company guarantees that the person who makes the report will not be treated 
unfairly; instead, the company will reward those who help improve the company’s 
safety management and environmental protection. 
 
In line with this statement, C1 had a policy to offer a reward of RMB 200 per reported 
near-miss to the reporting seafarer.  
 
The managers also suggested that it was in seafarers’ interests to make incident reports, as 
one marine engineering manager explained: 
If a seafarer hides problems, he does not fully understand the essence of the ISM 
Code and the safety management system. If you have identified a problem and 
made a report, it would be the company’s responsibility to solve this problem. If 
you cover up this problem, however, you would be held responsible when the 
managers discover this.  
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However, upon further examination, the managers revealed another, somewhat 
contradictory view: the fewer reports seafarers made, the better OHS outcome it suggested.  
Generally if they do not report any problem, it is good news. It indicates that the 
ship is run and managed well. (Marine Affairs Manager, C2) 
  
If neither the captain nor the chief engineer reports any problem, then this ship is 
perfect. It shows that everything is in good order. (Marine Engineering 
Superintendent, C1)  
 
The two quotations indicated a common understanding among the managers of both 
companies that the number of reported cases was an important indicator of the quality of 
shipboard OHS management.  
 
One of the main duties of the shore-based management was to monitor and assess whether 
a voyage plan had been successfully and properly implemented by the crew. From their 
perspective, the successful completion of a voyage meant fewer reports of any safety-
related problems. A marine affairs manager in C2 commented:  
If the crew completed a voyage and did not report any incident or accident, this 
would mean that the ship did not cause any major economic loss to the company. 
This is a successful completion of the voyage.  
 
The management of the two companies thus showed ambivalent attitudes: on the one hand, 
they claimed to encourage reporting of safety issues, and on the other, they hoped to see 
fewer reports. The question is how seafarers interpreted and reacted to this ambivalence in 
practice, to which this paper turns next. 
 
Reluctance to report 
The safety management policy and objectives were posted in public areas on the ships of 
both companies. The crew demonstrated a clear understanding of the reporting policy, and 
was aware that each of the crew members had the responsibility to report safety-related 
events to the shore management. For example, two third engineers explained in the 
interviews:  
According to the requirement of the safety management system, any problem, 
however tiny it is, should be reported. Even if the problem has been sorted out by 
ourselves, it should reported.  
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The report must be made. Deficiency reports must be made regularly. It is not 
realistic if you do not have any deficiency (to report).  
  
Even with an adequate understanding of company OHS policies, the crew acted differently 
in practice. According to the policies, nonconformity cases had to be communicated to the 
shore-based management on a monthly basis in the form of ‘monthly self-inspection 
reports’. Seafarers, however, were reluctant to make any report, because reporting 
nonconformity cases would imply that the crew’s safety management onboard was poor. 
For example, one fourth engineer in C2 said in the interview:  
If we report them, it is certainly not good for us. It has the implication that we do 
not do our work well.  
 
A common view was held among seafarers that if a lot of cases were reported, it would 
worsen the management’s impressions of the crew on that ship. The shore management 
might think that the ship’s leaders were incompetent, as two seafarer officers explained:  
If the crew reported lots of problems, the shore management would think: this ship 
often makes many reports, while other ships do not. The shore management would 
think that your ship had safety problems and that the ship’s leaders were no good.  
 
If we solve all problems by ourselves, this shows that we are competent. 
Otherwise, if we require support from the shore management, it might mean that 
we lack competency. Others would have second thoughts about us.  
 
Clearly, the shore-based management successfully communicated to seafarers both the 
company reporting policy and their belief that fewer reports indicated better OHS results. 
A chief officer in C2 made this point explicit: 
For the Marine Affairs Department, they wanted the ship crew to report fewer 
problems, right? If we report more deficiencies, it would not be good in the eyes 
of the company senior managers. It would also involve the relevant shore-based 
management departments in the problem.  
 
These words revealed another point. As the reported items were likely to be investigated 
thoroughly by the senior managers or designated persons of the company, crew members 
were worried that the reported problems would lead senior managers to think that the 
superintendent in charge of the ship had failed in his managerial and supervisory duty. In 
other words, they were concerned that superintendents might get blamed because of their 
reports.  
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In order to save the superintendents from any blame, the senior officers would normally 
make informal communication with them before sending a formal written report if a 
deficiency had to be reported. Through information communication, the superintendent in 
charge of the ship would provide ‘guidance’ regarding how the report should be written. 
One chief officer in C1 explained this process:  
Sometimes, the superintendent hopes that you report by telephone, while other 
times, they hope you report in writing. If we send a written report directly, it would 
be very formal. His (superintendent’s) boss would also be able to see it, which 
would affect the superintendent himself. This might not help us. So we would 
make a telephone call to the superintendent first to discuss the report in order not 
to annoy him.  
 
To be sure, this strategy was learned through interaction with shore-based management. 
One second engineer in C2 recounted a story:  
On one ship, the engine of one lifeboat could not be started manually, and we 
reported this deficiency to the company. Later, a superintendent contacted us, 
asking the captain to have a thorough check of the problem before reporting it. It 
was a hint that the ship should not have reported this deficiency.  
 
Seafarers also learnt through experience that shore management would be annoyed if some 
‘inherent’ deficiencies, particularly equipment problems that are difficult and costly to 
solve, were reported. Some cases were observed during the four research voyages, 
including the cargo pump problem on S1 C1, the tank heating system on S2 C1, and the 
anchoring system on S4 C2. They all had functional deficiencies, and it caused the crew 
troubles to make them work temporarily. However, the management did not want the 
problems to be reported in written form, as one second engineer said:  
If you submitted a report about an inherent deficiency, they would ask you, 
‘Should the ship be scrapped to eliminate the problem?’   
 
The reason for discouraging such reports was that if these problems were reported, they 
would have to be dealt with in accordance with the costly formal procedure set out in the 
safety management system. As revealed by other studies (Kongsvik et al., 2012; Oltedal 
and McArthur, 2011), the concern of management over cost-effectiveness prevented 
seafarers from making deficiency reports. Seafarers were worried that they would give the 
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management a bad impression if they reported such issues, as a captain in C2 revealed in 
the interview:  
If I reported a deficiency that could not be solved easily by the company, the 
company might think that I was intentionally making things difficult.  
 
Safety bonus and promotion 
The data has shown that instead of following clearly specified company policies and 
procedures, the crew learned to read the minds of the managers and superintendents 
through routine interactions and acted accordingly. In other words, they engaged in 
decoupling in accordance with management expectations. Why did the crew choose to 
conform? The main reason was that both companies operated a reward and punishment 
scheme in the form of a safety bonus. Accident and deficiency reporting could affect 
seafarers’ safety bonus. As mentioned earlier, all the work on ships was well structured 
across different hierarchical levels, and each position was assigned a specific duty in terms 
of the division of labour. Therefore, it was quite easy to identify to whom a deficiency was 
related. The reported items would be assessed by the shore management as evidence when 
deciding a seafarer’s safety bonus in accordance with the company’s scheme. In C1, the 
safety bonus comprised several separate items, including a one-hundred day safety bonus 
and a fuel consumption saving reward. In C2, it amounted to ten percent of a seafarer’s 
total salary. During the field work, the crew expressed a similar concern for their safety 
bonus: 
We work here to earn money, and therefore we are worried that they might deduct 
our bonus. For some deficiencies they would say it’s our fault and deduct our 
bonus, even though we would not think so (Pumpman, C2).  
 
The amount of the safety bonus was basically decided by the shore-based management. 
Although some crew members felt this was ‘unfair’, they would get only whatever was 
given to them.  
 
Furthermore, the safety bonus scheme was collective. When an accident happened on a 
ship, the safety bonus for the whole crew would be affected. A few personal injuries on the 
four ships were witnessed and recorded in the field notes by the field researcher, but none 
of them were reported. One of the cases is below:  
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The motorman showed me his bloody finger. His finger was hit by a roller, and 
his thumbnail came off. The cut was briefly treated. Luckily, he was sent to 
hospital one day later when the ship called the foreign port. On the return voyage, 
I asked the second engineer how the shore management responded. He said the 
accident had not been reported. I continued to ask why it was. He replied that if it 
was reported, the management would think it was caused by a violation of 
operational procedures, which would lead to a deduction of everybody’s safety 
bonus onboard. But the real cause was fatigue. 
 
Apart from the impact on income, reporting could also affect the promotion prospects of 
seafarers. In order to be promoted to a higher position, a seafarer would need his company 
to arrange a license upgrading exam. In such an arrangement the shore-based management 
would prioritise those whose were seen as good performers, with the reported cases being 
a key indicator of a seafarer’s performance. This was particularly true in C1, where a 
majority of the seafarers had long-term contracts with their company, as one second officer 
explained:  
If I do not perform well and a problem related to my job was reported, it would 
affect the company’s decision for the arrangement of my license upgrading 
examination which in turn would affect my promotion. They are all related.  
 
Furthermore, even if a seafarer passed the exam and his license was upgraded, the 
appointment to a senior position was decided by shore-based management. One chief 
engineer explained:  
If a senior officer does not perform well, it is impossible for him to be promoted 
to captain or chief engineer. The managers and superintendents have the decisive 
power on his appointment. 
 
Thus even if a chief officer obtained a captain’s qualification, he might not be appointed 
to a ship as a captain supervised by a superintendent who disliked that person or distrusted 
his capability. Clearly the shore management was in a very powerful position, which 
explained why seafarers also considered the impact on superintendents when making 
reports.   
 
Onboard solidarity 
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The practice of incident report was further complicated by a sense of solidarity onboard. 
The crew was literally all on the same boat, and they prioritised good collegial relationships 
when considering safety reporting. One rating pointed out: 
If you made such a report, you would have offended that person. We all know 
each other and are not willing to offend others.  
 
This sense of solidarity is not unique to Chinese sailors and in other contexts it was also 
found to influence incident reporting (Bhattacharya, 2012; Rossignol, 2015). Nevertheless, 
‘avoidance of conflict and need for harmony’, as part of the core values of Confucianism, 
are upheld by the Chinese people (Fang, 1999). To maintain ‘harmony’ onboard, a chief 
officer in C1 explained why and how a captain should take everybody’s interest into 
account: 
When reporting near-misses, captain would consider our interests. Captain is the 
same as us. We work together, and we are colleagues, brothers. …Once, the ship 
was sailing at sea, and the third officer was on duty. When Captain went to the 
bridge, he could not see the sky line as there was a very big ship ahead. Captain 
immediately took control. Luckily, an accident was avoided. If he reported it, the 
third officer’s career would definitely be finished.  
 
Nevertheless, when an accident occurred which could not be covered up, it had to be 
reported to the company by senior officers. In such a situation, senior officers also had 
many factors to consider when making the report. For example, a chief engineer talked 
about his observations and experiences in dealing with a previous accident report: 
The way of dealing with this is: first, do not associate yourself with the causes of 
the accident in the report; second, do not associate your colleagues with the causes 
of the accident; and third, do not associate your managers with the causes of the 
accident. If you throw all the blame to the company, do you mean that the shore 
management is not competent? Definitely, this is not good. Then what do we do? 
Try to find and identify some external environmental factors as the underlying 
causes. The principle is to minimise or avoid any potential impact on people.  
 
This view was commonly held by senior officers who had experienced one or more 
accidents. When drafting an accident report, they would try to attribute blame to factors 
that were beyond human control.  
 
Thus, in order to protect themselves and their colleagues, the crew had to make careful 
decisions regarding not only what they report, but also how they report it if the reporting 
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was unavoidable. This practice indicated not only under-reporting but also manipulated 
reporting.  
 
A façade of continuous improvement 
During the four voyages, the field researcher noted that interestingly both companies paid 
particular attention to near-miss reporting, and to encourage such reports, they adopted an 
anonymous approach to emphasise a non-blame policy. On the two ships in C1, there were 
two boxes labelled ‘NEAR MISS’, one in the meeting room and the other in the mess room. 
They were there for the collection of voluntary, anonymous reports by whoever onboard 
witnessed an unsafe act or behaviour. In C2, it was a compulsory requirement that at least 
two near-miss cases be reported every month.  
 
At the same time, however, the safety management systems of the two companies specified 
that the reported cases should not repeat what had been previously reported from any ship 
in the company fleet. The reason was that since all the ships in the fleet had been informed 
of those cases, repeated reporting could only indicate irresponsibility regarding company 
notifications. For instance, a chief officer said:  
All the near-miss cases that have been reported previously should not be repeated. 
If it has occurred once and it occurs a second time, then it proves that your (ship’s) 
management was not good.  
 
According to the general principle of the ISM Code, by collecting and analysing incident 
and near-miss occurrences, organisations would be able to learn their root causes and make 
more effective prevention efforts so that mistakes identified would not be made again in 
the future. This principle is about continuous improvement. Both companies were trying 
to demonstrate that they had achieved continuous improvement in their OHS management 
and that they had implemented the ISM Code successfully.  In practice, however, the non-
repetition rule led to a gradual reduction in reportable cases, instead of a reduction in 
incident occurrences, as one captain in C1 made this point clear:  
Generally, the number of reportable near-miss cases was reduced. We have made 
reports of whatever we are able to think of. We are running out of ideas what we 
should report next, because we are not supposed to repeat the mistakes we made 
before.  
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This problem was more serious for the crew in C2 where it was mandatory to report two 
near-miss cases per ship every month. In order to meet the requirement, two deck officers 
described how they responded to this requirement:  
We have to submit a report even if there are no such cases. What should we report 
if there is none? The only way is to fabricate something.  
 
For the purpose of collecting near-miss cases, captain would ask whenever he met 
us, ‘Report a case to me today’ in a joking tone.  
 
The responses of the crew on the two ships in C2 showed that they did not take this 
requirement seriously in their work practice. They treated it as a joke.  
 
As such, the impression of continuous OHS improvement that the two companies tried to 
give was just a façade, behind which there was the reality of decoupling between policy 
and practice. The question is why both companies made such deliberate efforts to build up 
and maintain this façade. The answer lies in external inspections.  
 
External inspections 
Reporting safety related problems to the shore-based management was not only a 
requirement of the safety management system but also subject to external inspections. As 
mentioned earlier, strict external inspection regimes are in place for chemical shipping, 
such as the Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE) and Chemical Distribution Institute 
(CDI) – Marine inspection programme. Chemical tankers have to pass these inspections on 
a regular basis in order to conduct business in the market (Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013).  
 
When conducting inspections on ships, inspectors from oil majors or CDI would check 
OHS management documents, including safety related reports. These reports served as the 
key evidence of free safety communication and successful ISM implementation in a 
company. During the field voyage on one ship of C1, the chief officer told one story. 
Several years ago, the company told the ship crew to hide all the deficiency reports (treated 
as internal confidential documents) prior to an external inspection. But the absence of any 
deficiency report was judged by the external inspector to be a deficiency. Thus, it is not 
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surprising that safety reporting was emphasised by both companies for the purpose of 
inspection.   
 
However, seafarers also learned from their interactions with inspectors that it was not good 
either to have too many written reports. One second engineer explained:  
Reporting too many deficiencies is not good for external inspections. If an 
inspector found that you had many deficiency reports, he would doubt your ship’s 
management and check in more detail.  
 
Furthermore, if a deficiency report was made in writing, it would have to be dealt with 
according to the relevant procedures in the management system, which meant that follow-
up measures would have to be taken, and written records would also have to be maintained 
accordingly. If a deficiency had not been, or could not be, rectified entirely, it would raise 
more questions during an inspection. As mentioned earlier, the shore management did not 
welcome reports that would be costly to deal with. This was another reason why, as 
mentioned earlier, the crew learned to communicate informally with the superintendents 
and seek their guidance first before sending out a written deficiency report.   
 
An alternative solution was not to make report on serious issues, as a chief officer 
explained:  
We had certain considerations. We could not report all the issues to the shore-
based management. We could not report nothing either. Therefore we usually 
report some innocuous cases.  
 
What were ‘innocuous cases’? One second officer and one bosun gave examples:  
Sometimes, if it is hard to find anything, I just randomly write something 
unimportant, for example, I find something that is going to expire.   
 
In the galley the flour was put on the fire prevention station, which was not 
allowed. Let’s make a report.  
 
These cases were in fact near-miss reports as discussed in the previous section. The 
problems reflected in these reports were easy to address; and the written reports showed 
inspectors evidence that safety related issues were reported to and addressed by the shore-
based management. Since inspectors cannot see the routine practices of OHS management 
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on the ships, they could only take these documents at face value. The façade of continuous 
improvement did seem to have a function. It helped them pass inspections without making 
significant investment in rectifying deficiencies.  
 
Discussion 
In compliance with the ISM Code, both companies had policies and procedures requiring 
incident reporting. In practice, it was the crew who initiated the reporting process, and it 
was the crew who decided what and how they should report. Nevertheless, such decisions 
were made based on their previous interactions with and the prior knowledge of the shore-
based management, as well as their experiences with inspections.  
 
Through their interactions with shore-based management, the crew learned that despite the 
management rhetoric of a non-blame culture, the managers regarded reported deficiencies 
as problems, perhaps related to a crew’s incompetency. Furthermore, they also learned that 
the management were not willing to read reports regarding machinery deficiencies and 
problems that would be expensive to deal with, and that the superintendents did not expect 
to receive reports which could potentially expose their negligence. To be sure, external 
inspectors monitored incident reporting and safety communication between the ship and 
the shore regularly. Both the shore-based management and crew nevertheless learned some 
tactics to cope with such monitoring. They learnt that near-miss reports could on the one 
hand demonstrate free communication and continuous OHS management improvement to 
inspectors, and on the other, avoid further questioning from inspectors as well as avoid 
revelation of deficiencies that would be costly to rectify. As such, the practice of reporting 
was substantially defined by the interaction between the crew, the shore-based 
management, and external inspectors.  
 
Surely, these interactions were not devoid of power considerations; they take place within 
and are shaped by unequal power relations (Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013). Evidently, the 
management had power over the crew as they controlled the crews’ bonus pay and career 
development. Due to power relations and self-interest, the crew actively sought cues from 
their managers/superintendents regarding incident reporting and (re)acted accordingly. In 
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a similar vein, external inspectors had power over the shipping companies and the 
managers and the crew paid attention to, and strategically adjusted their practices to meet 
these external demands.    
 
In previous CSR literature (e.g. Christmann and Taylor, 2006; Egels-Zandén, 2014; Jamali 
et al., 2017), stringent external monitoring and pressure was found to help integrate policy 
and practice. This paper reveals significant decoupling in the ISM implementation and 
incident reporting despite regular external monitoring. It was routine management practice 
to ignore expensive OHS deficiencies and to discourage the crew from reporting them. 
External surveillance did not manage to foster management commitment as previous 
research indicated (Egels-Zandén, 2014; Gunningham et al., 2004; 2005; Jamali et al., 
2017). This failure largely resulted from a practical constraint faced by inspectors, that is, 
when conducting inspections, they are restrained from getting access to daily management 
practices and mainly relied on written documents. The management and crew worked 
together to make a façade of continuous OHS management improvement using written 
documents, which inspectors could only take at face value. This constraint thus limited the 
power and pressure they could exert on the shipping companies regarding their OHS 
management.   
 
Therefore while policy reflects the intention of the policy makers, the practical 
implementation is defined by the interaction between the relevant stakeholders which in 
turn is shaped by the underlying power relations and constraints. Egels-Zandén (2014) 
points out that external monitoring in some cases empowers workers and raises awareness 
of their rights. In this research, the crew was well aware of the ISM requirements and the 
policy, but due to the power dynamics discussed above they had to fulfill the expectations 
of the management.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has revealed the decoupled implementation of the ISM Code in the Chinese 
chemical shipping industry and the factors that underline these practices. As the research 
was conducted in two Chinese shipping companies, the findings may not be generalised to 
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other shipping companies. Nevertheless, these findings corroborate other research accounts 
in the tanker shipping sector elsewhere that shore-based management lacks genuine 
commitment to OHS but prioritised cost effectiveness and that seafarers were reluctant to 
report any safety related issues for fear of being blamed (Bhattacharya, 2011; 2012; 
Sampson, 2016). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the practices revealed in this research 
are common in the tanker shipping sector. The tanker shipping sector can be seen as a 
‘critical case’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) because this sector is subject to more stringent external 
surveillance and sanctions in terms of OHS management. If decoupled ISM 
implementation is common in this sector, it is likely to be common as well in other shipping 
sectors where there are less stringent external monitoring schemes.  
 
The findings suggest policy and practice integration is affected by the interaction between 
the relevant stakeholders and reflects underlying power dynamics. In this context, if 
decoupling is employed by top management to solve the conflict between compliance with 
regulations and profit-maximising activities, questions, such as why some seafarers make 
more reports than others and what are the contributory factors, become irrelevant. With 
little power and the necessity for seafarers to meet the expectations of management OHS 
policy and day to day practice will diverge. Thus, it would be of limited value trying to 
change the crew’s performance and behaviour before addressing the fundamental cause of 
decoupling – the commitment from the top management.      
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